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Abstract 
 
 
This study analyzes the impact of reducing inflation volatility versus the impact of 
improving financial institutions with regard to the country’s sovereign debt rating.  An empirical 
analysis of the impact of inflation, inflation volatility and financial institutions on a country’s 
sovereign debt rating is undertaken using a sample of 37 developed and developing countries 
over the period 1989–2006. The study estimates a non-linear rating regression that interacts 
inflation volatility with an index for financial institutions developed in this paper using the 
principal component analysis. The results suggest that reducing inflation volatility can have a 
statistically and economically significant positive effect on a country’s sovereign debt rating as 
compared to the level of inflation.  The results also show that improving financial institutions has 
a statistically and economically significant positive direct and indirect effect on a country’s 
sovereign debt rating.  A decrease of one standard deviation in inflation volatility leads to an 
increase of about two classifications in a country’s sovereign debt rating. The increase in 
sovereign debt rating leads to a reduction in the average annual long-term bond yield by about 
4.4%.  On the other hand, an increase of one standard deviation in the financial institutions’ 
index leads to an increase in the ratings class of about one class, which in turn reduces the 
average annual long-term bond yield by about 4.27%. 
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This paper attempts to investigate the impact of inflation volatility versus financial 
institutions on a country’s sovereign debt rating.  Any decrease in inflation volatility or any 
improvement in institutions tends to lead to a higher rating classification in a developing 
economy.  As the rating increases, the cost of borrowing decreases and the economy can make 
use of cheap credit. Such an economy accumulates more capital and, therefore, its output 
increases.  
 
This study contributes to the sovereign debt rating literature by demonstrating that the 
negative impacts of high inflation volatility influence a country’s sovereign debt rating more 
than the negative impacts of high levels of inflation.  Once the volatility of inflation is included 
in the regression, the level of inflation turns insignificant.  In addition, the study shows that 
improving financial institutions has a statistically significant positive direct and indirect effect on 
sovereign debt rating; the indirect effect occurs through a positive interaction with inflation 
volatility which helps to reduce the negative impacts of inflation volatility on the sovereign debt 
rating. 
 
Despite the importance of inflation volatility and financial institutions to sovereign debt 
rating, the economic literature on the determinants of sovereign debt rating has mostly ignored 
the role played by these two factors.  The literature on sovereign debt rating has mainly 
categorized the sovereign debt rating determinants into four main groups: (a) liquidity and 
solvency variables; (b) macroeconomic variables; (c) external shock variables; and (d) dummy 
variables.  The liquidity and solvency variables usually include ratios of debt to GDP, 
international reserves to GDP, debt service to exports and the current account to GDP. The 
macroeconomic variables usually include real growth, inflation rate, fiscal balance and real 
exchange rate; the external shock variables usually include international interest rates; and 
finally, the dummy variables usually include those variables that reflect economic crises and 
other structural problems.2 
  
  For instance, using an ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis on pooled data for 35 
developed and developing countries, Cantor and Packer (1996) studied the effect of the level of 
inflation in addition to other macroeconomic variables and a dummy variable for the country’s 
default history.  Their study finds that both inflation and the ratio of foreign currency external 
debt to exports have a negative statistical significant effect on rating while both per capita 
income and GDP growth have a positive significant effect.  
  
  Using a stepwise procedure, Haque et al (1998) tested the importance of macroeconomic 
determinants versus political determinants in affecting a country’s credit worthiness. The study 
finds that inflation has a statistically significant negative impact on the country’s credit 
worthiness, using both the credit worthiness rating provided by institutional investors and Euro 
money.  
 
Afonso (2003) applied the same methodology as in Cantor and Packer (1996) to a sample 
of 81 developed and developing countries, except that he used both the linear and logistic 
transformation of the rating.  In line with Cantor and Packer (op. cit.), the study shows a 
statistically significant negative effect of inflation on sovereign debt rating.  
                                                
2 Min (1998) provides a good literature review on these four groups. 
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Since the determinants of sovereign debt rating tend to be similar to those of the spreads, 
being that both are measures of risk, the literature on the spreads is also relevant.  For instance 
Min (1998) analyzes the determinants of yield spread of US dollar-denominated fixed income 
securities using panel least squares methodology on 11 countries over the period 1991–1995.  
The results emphasize the importance of macroeconomic fundamentals, including inflation − if a 
country were to gain access to the international bond market.  Similarly, Eichengreen and Mody 
(1998) and Kamin and Kleist (1999) stress the importance of “market sentiment,” in addition to 
country-specific fundamentals and external factors, to explain variations in sovereign spreads in 
emerging markets. 
 
Using a panel least squares regression estimation for a sample of 16 emerging countries, 
Rowland and Torres (2004) studied the macroeconomic determinants of spread for the US 
Treasuries of emerging market sovereign issues and the issuers’ credit worthiness based on the 
institutional investor credit worthiness index.  Although the authors used the same 
macroeconomic determinants for both the spread and the credit worthiness regressions, their 
results show that inflation significantly affects the credit worthiness of the issuing country, but it 
does not have a significant effect on the spread. 
 
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, Brooks, and Yip (2005) made a study of the determinants of 
sovereign debt rating using two different approaches: (a) ordered probit and (b) case-based 
reasoning.  Their results show that inflation and GDP appear to be the most significant 
macroeconomic variables, following the significance of the proxy for technological 
development.  Similarly, using an OLS regression framework, Rowland (2005) finds that 
inflation is one of six macroeconomic variables that significantly affect credit ratings, credit 
worthiness and spreads.  
 
Finally and more recently, using panel regression estimation for 27 emerging countries, 
Remolona, Santigna, and Wub (2007) find that inflation is one among many other variables that 
have a significant effect on their constructed measure of sovereign default risk which they call 
Rating-Implied Expected Loss (RIEL).3  The results are confirmed with another measure of 
country risk, namely average agency rating. 
 
 Unfortunately, the literature on the impact of macroeconomic policy volatility in general, 
and of inflation volatility in particular, on sovereign debt rating, is quite sparse.   For instance, 
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) investigate the impact of macroeconomic volatility on sovereign 
default risk.  Their study concludes that in the presence of unexpected adverse shocks,  a positive 
relation exists between the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates and default.  
 
 Using the logit estimation technique, Catao (2002) tested whether macroeconomic 
volatility helps explain the variation in sovereign default probability.  His paper distinguishes 
between externally induced volatility and policy-induced volatility. Using a sample of 25 
emerging economies over the period 1970–2001, he concludes that there is a positive relation 
between macroeconomic volatility and sovereign default.  
                                                
3 The RIEL is measured with the agency credit rating and the historical default risk.  As mentioned in their paper, it 
decomposes the spread into a risk component and a risk premium component.  
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Despite the growing body of literature on the importance of institutions to a country’s 
long-term economic growth, to the best of our knowledge, there are only two studies on the 
impact of institutions on sovereign debt rating.   Using the Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) on a 
sample of 86 developed and emerging countries, Butler and Fauver (2006) investigated the effect 
of legal and political institutions, in addition to macroeconomic variables and the level of 
inflation on the sovereign debt rating measured by the institutional investor.4  They report that 
inflation, besides other macroeconomic variables, has a statistical significant effect on rating. 
Adding a composite index representing the effect of the legal environment, the study finds that 
legal environment is the most influential variable in their regression.  
 
More recently using linear and ordered response models, Afonso, Gomes, and Rother 
(2011) studied the short- and long-run determinants of sovereign debt ratings from three main 
rating agencies, for the period 1995-2005.  Their study shows that short-run determinants include 
the changes in GDP per capita, GDP growth, government debt and government balance.  ON the 
other hand, long-run determinants include government effectiveness, external debt, foreign 
reserves and default history. 
 
Against the above background, using a sample of 37 developed and developing countries 
over the period 1989–2006, this study extends the previous literature on sovereign rating in 
several ways.  Firstly, it empirically tests the role of inflation volatility alongside the role of the 
inflation level to explain variations in the sovereign debt rating.  Secondly, it empirically tests 
the direct and the indirect role of financial institutions in determining sovereign debt rating. 
Thirdly, it computes the total effect of a one standard deviation reduction in inflation volatility, 
as compared to the total effect of a one standard deviation improvement in the financial 
institutions’ index.  Finally, this study links the changes in sovereign debt rating to the changes 
in annual long-term average annual bond yield. 
 
 
 
Empirical Specification 
 
 
The TSLS methodology with regional dummies and period fixed effects is used to 
estimate the determinants of sovereign debt rating for the sample of 37 developed and 
developing countries over the period 1989–2006.  Using three-year period averages, there are six 
periods to work with.  
 
Equation 1 represents the base model of the estimation: 
 
tittitititi dInfvolCVSovSov ,,3,2,10, εββββ υ +++++= −  .                                (Equation 1) 
 
                                                
4 The paper uses the governance indicators provided by the World Bank database and measured by Kaufman, Kraay 
and Mastruzzi (2003).  These governance indicators include the voice of the people, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption control.  In addition, the authors developed a composite 
index for these six indices. 
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The subscripts i and t represent the country and the time period, respectively. The variable tiSov ,  
is the Moody’s sovereign debt rating. The set of explanatory variables consists of υ−tiSov , , which 
represents the first lag of the sovereign debt rating, and tiCV , which represents the set of control 
variables that are measured as an average over period υ , where υ = 3. This set of control 
variables includes the average level of inflation, the average ratio of private domestic credit to 
GDP, the average ratio of per capita GDP and three regional dummies for Latin American 
countries, Asian countries and African and Middle Eastern countries: LD , AD , and AMD  
respectively5. tiInfvol ,  represents the average log of inflation volatility over the three-year 
period.  Finally, td  represents the time period dummies.  
 
It is worth noting that additional variables were considered for the model, but were 
excluded due to their statistically insignificant coefficients.  These variables included the current 
account as a percentage of GDP, the log of the nominal GDP, unemployment as a percentage of 
the labor force and the total reserves minus gold. Their statistical insignificance is probably due 
to the high correlation between the variables. For example, the current account is highly 
correlated with the total reserves minus gold. Likewise, the nominal GDP is highly correlated 
with the per capita GDP.  Equation 1 constitutes the base of a parsimonious model that estimates 
the relations of interest for the purposes of this study. 
 
The base model is expanded to include a term for the interaction of inflation volatility 
with the Chinn and Ito (2005) index of financial institutions called LEGAL2. The index is 
estimated using a principal component analysis of four indices: (a) protection of creditors’ rights; 
(b) protection of shareholders’ rights; (c) transparency of companies’ accounts; and (d) 
enforcement of laws . The data on these four indices are time invariant and are collected from La 
Porta et al. (1998). 
 
The objective of including the interaction term is to estimate the indirect effect of 
financial institutions on the relation between inflation volatility and sovereign debt rating. The 
interaction term is estimated by adding )*2(4 InfvolL iβ  to the right-hand side of Equation 1 
where iL2  represents the Legal2 Index for country i.  
 
After adding the interaction term to Equation 1, the new model is shown below: 
 
tittii
titititi
dInfvolL
InfvolCVSovSov
,,4
,3,2,10,
)*2( εβ
ββββ υ
+++
+++= −  .                              (Equation 2) 
 
It is important to note that the estimation of Equation 2 is crucial to computing the total 
effect of inflation volatility on sovereign debt rating. This total effect is computed by adding up 
the estimated coefficient of inflation volatility 3βˆ  to the estimated coefficient of the interaction 
                                                
5 To avoid the dummy variable trap, the dummy that represents countries in the Organization for Economic    
Cooperation and Development (OECD) is omitted, but its effect is picked up by the intercept 0β . 
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term 4βˆ  where this later coefficient is multiplied by the iL2  index. Thus, the total effect of 
inflation volatility is equal to ( )iL2*ˆˆ 43 ββ +  in Equation 2.  
 
Additionally, when Equation 2 is augmented by )*2( ,4 tii InfvolLβ  to represent the 
indirect effect of financial institutions, the variable iL2 , or the direct effect of financial 
institutions, is included in the set of instruments of the TSLS. 
 
Next, the total effect of a one standard deviation change in the Legal2 Index is computed 
by adding iL2  to Equation 2 as shown in Equation 3. The total effect of Legal2 Index is be 
calculated as )ˆ*ˆ( 5,4 ββ +tiInfvol . 
 
tititii
titititi
dLInfvolL
InfvolCVSovSov
,5,4
,3,2,10,
2)*2( εββ
ββββ υ
++++
+++= −  .       (Equation 3) 
 
 
Data 
 
 
The data set is constructed as a panel of country observations from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank’s database. The data set includes 37 developed and 
developing countries over the period 1989-2006. The data set is averaged into three-years time 
periods and thus, is available for six-time series observations for each country.  The list of 
countries included in the sample is reported in Table 1 and the data on the dependent and 
independent variables are plotted in Figure 2 of the Appendix. 
 
The data on the sovereign debt rating, or the dependent variable, is collected from the 
Moody’s sovereign debt ratings 6.  It is worthwhile to note that there are two other alternative 
sovereign debt-rating measures provided by Standard and Poor (S&P) and Fitch, Inc. as revealed 
in Gaillard (2009).  These three measures are very similar in terms of their rating scale, where 
both Moody’s and S&P’s have 23 rating categories and Fitch’s has 24, with a higher scale, 
implying higher values.      
 
 Following the literature that started with Horrigan (1966) through Billet (1996), Cantor 
and Packer? (1996) and more recently, Gaillard (2009), the paper assigns numerical values to the 
Moody’s letter ratings as follows: C = 1, Ca = 2, and so on through Aaa =23.  A complete list of 
the ratings and the assigned numerical values are available in Table 13 of the Appendix.  
 
The sovereign debt rating indicates the capacity and willingness of a government to repay 
back its obligations in full and on time. The Moody’s rating, which relates to foreign currency, 
focuses on measuring the expected credit loss, which depends on the probability of default, and 
                                                
6Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3,Aa, A1, A2, A3, A, ,Baa1, Baa2, Baa3,Ba1, Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2, B3,Caa1, Caa2, Caa3, Ca, C.   
  For detailed definition on each rating classification, check Rowland (2005). 
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the expected recovery rate after the default has occurred.7  More specifically, the sovereign debt 
rating for a given government is defined as the risk facing an investor who holds debt securities 
issued by that government which in turn reflects its credit worthiness. 
 
                                     Table 1.   List of Countries Included in the Sample 
 
1 Argentina (Arg) 20 Korea, Rep. (Kor) 
2 Australia (Ausl) 21 Malaysia  (Mal) 
3 Austria (Aus) 22 Mexico  (Mex) 
4 Belgium (Bel) 23 Netherlands (Neth)  
5 Brazil (Bra) 24 New Zealand (N.Z) 
6 Canada (Can) 25 Norway (Nor) 
7 Chile (Chi) 26 Peru (Per) 
8 Colombia (Col) 27 Portugal (Por) 
9 Denmark  (Den) 28 Singapore (Sin) 
10 Egypt (Egy)  29 South Africa ( S.A) 
11 Finland  (Fin) 30 Spain (Spa) 
12 France (Fra) 31 Sweden (Swe) 
13 Germany (Ger) 32 Switzerland (Swi) 
14 Greece (Gre) 33 Thailand (Tha) 
15 Hong Kong (HK)  34 Turkey  (Tur) 
16 India (Ind) 35 United Kingdom (UK) 
17 Israel  (Isr) 36 United States (US) 
18 Italy (Ita) 37 Uruguay (Uru) 
19 Japan (Jap)   
                                       
N.B.  Letters in parentheses represent the abbreviation used for each county.   
 
Moreover, as noted in the Moody’s guide provided by Moody’s Investor Service-Global 
Credit Research of Cailleteau, Cipriani, Lindow, and Byrne (2008),  that despite the fact that 
assigning a rating classification to each country depends on a group of economic, financial, 
social and political factors, the rating is “strictly constructed as assessing credit risk. Therefore, 
one cannot directly infer general assessments about a country's economic prosperity, dynamism, 
competitiveness or governance from Moody's government bond ratings.”  
 
Table 2 provides definitions on the data set used in this study.  Inflation rate is computed 
as the average of the growth of the consumer price index over each of the six periods. 
Additionally, the domestic credit data is calculated as the average of the domestic credit to the 
private sector as a percentage of GDP over each of the six periods.  Similarly, the per capita GDP 
is computed as the average of GDP per capita (constant $2000) over each of the six periods. 
 
 
 
                                                
7 )1).(( ee rdL −= ρ , where eL  is the expected loss, )(dρ is the probability of default, and er  is the expected   
   recovery rate as noted in Bhatia (2002). 
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Table 2.   Definition of Variables 
Variable Name Definition Unit of Measurement Data Source 
Sovereign Debt 
Rating 
 
Ratings assigned by Moody’s 
Aaa=23, 
Aa1=22…..,C=1 
Moody’s 
 
Inflation 
 
Percentage change in consumer price index 
 
% 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
InflationVolatility Log of the square root of the conditional 
variance series of inflation calculated by 
GARCH(1,1) model 
 
% 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Per capita GDP GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)  
US$ (thousands) 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Domestic Credit Domestic credit to private sector as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
% 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
LEGAL2 
Index 
Following Chinn and Ito (2005), LEGAL2 is 
the principal component of Creditors’ rights, 
Shareholders ‘rights, Accounts, and 
Enforcement indices.  It depicts the overall 
development of the legal system governing 
financial transactions. 
 
Units within the 
interval -2.90 and 
1.83 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Creditors’ Rights 
Index 
It is composed of the variables that 
incorporate the automatic stay proposition on 
the assets of a failing firm, the continuation 
of the old managers in a reorganization 
process, restrictions for going into 
reorganization and the seniority system of 
secured creditors. 
 
Units within the 
interval 0 to 4 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Shareholders 
‘Rights Index 
This index is composed of the sum of the one 
share-one-vote, proxy by mail, shares not 
blocked before meeting, cumulative 
voting/proportional presentation, oppressed 
minorities, preemptive right to new issues 
and percentage of share capital to call an 
emergency shareholder meeting less than 
10%.8  
 
Units within the 
interval 0.05 to 
5.10 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Accounts Index This index reflects the transparency and 
comprehensiveness of companies’ accounting 
reports 
 
Units within the 
interval 24 to 83. 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
Enforcement 
Index 
It consists of the average of the efficiency of 
judicial system, rule of law, risk of 
expropriation and risk of contract 
repudiation.  
Units within the 
interval 4.87 to 
9.99 
La Porta et al. 
(1998) 
 
 
Inflation volatility is calculated as the log of the square root of the conditional variance 
series of inflation calculated by GARCH(1,1) model. Specifically, an inflation AR(1) model is 
                                                
8 More details on these indices are provided in La Porta et al. (1998). 
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first estimated as ttt εγγ ++= −110 infinf  where tinf  refers to inflation and tε  denotes the error 
term. The error term is defined as ttt zσε =  , where tz  is N(0,1) and 
2
tσ takes the following 
form 
2
11
2
110
2
−− ++= ttt σβεαασ  with 00 ≻α , 01 ≥α , and 1β 0≥ .  Inflation volatility is thus 
computed as
2
11
2
110
2
−− ++= ttt σβεαασ .  
 
Clark (1997) notes that measuring inflation volatility as the coefficient of variation of the 
level of inflation provides an assurance that the level of inflation is not correlated with its 
variance and hence, does not pose any imperfect multicollinearity issues when both the level and 
volatility of inflation are included. 
 
Inflation volatility series is computed from the time series data of each country separately 
over the period 1989 - 2006.  It is then averaged over each of the six periods as done with the 
other regressands.  For three countries in the sample − Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay − the data 
of inflation volatility far exceeds the rest in the sample. To deal with this problem, a non-
subjective criterion is used such that the top 10% of the volatility distribution is discarded. 
Hence, the data on the log of inflation volatility falls within an interval of [-0.98, 1.3].  
 
Concerning the Legal2 Index, it varies only across countries but not over time. It ranges 
within the interval [-2.90, 1.83] where the higher the index is, the more developed the financial 
institutions.  The Legal2 Index consists of four components: (a) protection of creditors’ rights; 
(b) protection of shareholders’ rights; (c) transparency of companies accounts; and (d) 
enforcement of laws.  
 
The Index of Creditors’ Rights is composed of the variables that incorporate the 
automatic stay proposition on the assets of a failing firm, the continuation of the old managers in 
a reorganization process, restrictions for going into reorganization and the seniority system of 
secured creditors. This index ranges from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 4, where more 
protection for creditors implies a higher index.  
 
The degree of Law Enforcement Index consists of the average of the efficiency of judicial 
system, rule of law, risk of expropriation and risk of contract repudiation. This index ranges from 
a minimum of 4.87 to a maximum of 9.99, where a higher index implies a stricter system of law 
enforcement.  
 
The Index of Shareholder’s Rights is composed of the sum of the one share-one-vote, 
proxy by mail, shares not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting/proportional presentation, 
oppressed minorities, preemptive right to new issues and percentage of share capital to call an 
emergency shareholder meeting less than 10%.  This sub-index ranges from a minimum of 0.05 
to a maximum of 5.10, where the higher the index is, the better is the shareholders' protection.  
 
Finally the Account’s Index measures the transparency and comprehensiveness of 
companies’ accounting reports. This index ranges from a minimum of 24 to a maximum of 83. 
Again a higher index implies more transparency and better comprehensiveness of the reports.  
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The set of regional dummies includes: (a) dummy for Latin American countries; (b) 
dummy for OECD countries; (c) dummy for Asian countries;  and (d) dummy for the African 
and the Middle Eastern countries. The classification of countries among these four regions 
appears in Table 11 of the Appendix. 
 
Before proceeding into more details on these regressors, it is helpful to have a quick 
description of the relation between each variable and a country’s sovereign debt rating: 
  
• Inflation: the level of inflation acts as a proxy for the quality of the economic 
management of the country.  It is an indicator of the government’s control over fiscal and 
monetary policy. High inflation is expected to have a negative impact on sovereign debt 
rating. 
• Inflation Volatility: A high variation in the level of inflation creates an environment of 
uncertainty in the economy which is expected to have an additional impact on the credit 
worthiness of a country.  High inflation volatility is expected to add to the negative effect 
of high inflation on sovereign debt rating. 
• Per Capita Income: The greater the per capita income of a country, the greater is its 
potential tax base which increases the country’s ability to repay its debts. A high per 
capita income is expected to lead to a high sovereign debt rating. 
• Domestic Credit: A high ratio of domestic credit to the private sector as a ratio of GDP 
indicates the government‘s policy towards encouraging the engagement of the private 
sector into the economy. This variable can serve as a proxy of financial deepening of the 
economy.  A high ratio of domestic credit to GDP is expected to have a positive impact 
on sovereign debt rating. 
• Legal2 Index: As defined by Chinn and Ito (2005), this index pertains to the level of 
development of legal systems and institutions closely related to financial transactions. 
This variable can serve as a proxy for a country’s financial institutions. Where better 
financial institutions is stemmed from better protection of creditors’ rights and 
shareholders’ rights, better law enforcement and more transparency in the companies’ 
accounts. All of these components combined are expected to encourage national and 
international investments, which lead to higher economic growth.  Higher economic 
growth increases the country’s ability to pay its existing debt burdens which would 
consequently lead to higher sovereign debt rating. 
 
 
Estimation Results 
 
To avoid the endogeneity problem that might arise between the determinants of the 
sovereign debt rating, the TSLS methodology is used.  Before performing such a methodology, 
each series is first tested for stationarity using the panel unit root test developed by Levin, Lin 
and Chu (2002) with a lag selection based on the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). 
Assuming common unit root process, the results of the test suggest a rejection of a unit root for 
each of Moody’s rating, inflation, inflation volatility, per capita GDP, and domestic credit as a 
percent of GDP. 9 
       
                                                
9 Results are available from the author upon request. 
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After ensuring that the independent variables of the model pass the unit root test, the 
TSLS model is estimated under eight specifications of the independent variables. In each 
specification, the dependent variable is sovereign debt rating. The focus is on the partial 
correlations between sovereign debt rating and the measures of inflation volatility, financial 
institutions and their interaction term. 
  
  To estimate the model using TSLS, the correct set of instruments must first pass the 
instrument relevance test, as well as the instrument exogeneity test.  For the former test, the F-
statistic for the regressions in which each regressor is regressed on the whole set of instruments 
including regional and period dummies must exceed 10. This implies that the bias of the TSLS is 
at most 10% of the bias of the OLS estimator.  
 
For the instrument exogeneity test, or overidentification test, the hypothesis that the 
instruments are exogenous to the error term is tested. The hypothesis is rejected if the calculated 
J-statistic10 exceeds a chi-squared with m minus k restrictions at a chosen significant level, where 
m and k refer to the number of instruments and the number of endogenous regressors 
respectively. In addition, the Sargan p-value is calculated. 
 
The set of endogenous variables includes the level of inflation, volatility of inflation, 
domestic credit as a ratio to GDP, and GDP per capita. The set of exogenous variables, which are 
not correlated with the error term, include the constant term, the first lag of the sovereign debt 
rating, the Legal2 Index, the period fixed effects and the regional dummies. 
 
The set of instruments consists of all the exogenous variables in the model plus the first 
lag for each of the endogenous variables, the average value taken by each of the endogenous 
variables in the major trading partners for each country, longitudes, latitudes, and a dummy for 
English origin. The English origin dummy takes 1 if the legal origin of the country’s law is 
English common law and 0 otherwise.11  
 
This set of instrument passed both the relevance test and the exogeneity test.  For the 
former test, each one of the endogenous regressors is regressed in a turn on the whole set of 
instruments. Based on the values of the first stage F-statistic – shown in Table 3 – the set of 
instruments is relevant.  In addition, the p-values of the Sargan test of all the regressions – shown 
in Table 4 − indicate that the hypothesis of over-identifying moment conditions cannot be 
rejected, and hence the instruments are exogenous to the error term.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.   First Stage F-statistic of the TSLS 
Endogenous Variable First Stage F-Statistic 
Inflation 47.71 
Inflation Volatility 79.93 
                                                
10 Equal to the number of instruments multiplied by the second stage F-statistic. 
11 The data for the English origin dummy are taken from La Porta et al. (1998). 
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Domestic Credit 58.38 
Per Capita GDP 4136.77 
 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating eight regressions.  Column 1 shows the results of 
the sovereign regression with only an AR(1) term in addition to regional dummies. The sign and 
significance of the lagged rating is expected. When the average of the period level of inflation is 
added to the regression (Column 2), the coefficient of the lagged rating remains significant. The 
coefficient of inflation is also significant and the magnitude of this coefficient indicates that a 
one percent increase in the average over the period level of inflation corresponds to about 0.06 
drop in sovereign debt rating which is a minimal impact. 
 
Table 4.   Sovereign Debt Rating and Inflation Volatility 
Cross-country panel data consist of non-overlapping 3-year averages spanning 1989-2006. 
 [1] 
 
[2] 
 
[3] 
 
[4] 
 
[5] 
 
[6] [7] [8] 
Constant 5.63*** 
(1.24) 
7.79*** 
(2.19) 
8.59*** 
(2.03) 
8.33*** 
(1.96) 
-1.23 
(3.02) 
2.57 
(3.36) 
0.92 
(2.84) 
2.22 
(3.48) 
Lagged rating 0.73*** 
(0.06) 
0.64*** 
(0.96) 
0.61*** 
(0.90) 
0.56*** 
(0.1) 
0.44*** 
(0.09) 
0.42*** 
(0.10) 
0.44*** 
(0.09) 
0.43*** 
(0.09) 
Inflation  -0.06* 
(0.035) 
-0.03 
(0.041) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
Inflation volatility   -1.48* 
(0.87) 
 
-1.17 
(0.85) 
-1.82** 
(0.81) 
-1.60** 
(0.76) 
-
1.58*** 
(0.60) 
-1.53** 
(0.65) 
Domestic Credit/GDP    0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
per capita GDP     3.08*** 
(0.75) 
2.27*** 
(0.76) 
2.66*** 
(0.72) 
2.36*** 
(0.80) 
LEGAL2      0.60* 
(0.32) 
 0.34 
(0.44) 
Interaction of 
Volatility  LEGAL2 
      1.04*** 
(0.38) 
0.60 
(0.51) 
Dummy Latin -1.20 
(0.88) 
-1.71* 
(0.87) 
-1.71** 
(0.84) 
-1.73** 
(0.79) 
-1.38* 
(0.73) 
-1.15* 
(0.70) 
-1.27 
(0.80) 
-1.19 
(0.73) 
Dummy Africa/Middle-East  -0.56 
(0.83) 
-1.08 
(1.21) 
-1.77 
(1.32) 
-1.58 
(1.36) 
-0.91 
(1.09) 
-1.14 
(1.08) 
-1.20 
(1.11) 
-1.23 
(1.08) 
Dummy Asian -1.48** 
(0.71) 
-2.01** 
(0.95) 
-2.06** 
(0.99) 
-2.21** 
(1.11) 
-0.58 
(1.10) 
-1.32 
(1.09) 
-1.28 
(0.97) 
-1.43 
(1.01) 
Countries/Observations 34/167 34/167 34/166 34/166 34/165 34/165 34/165 34/165 
Adjusted R-squared 0.836 0.835 0.843 0.845 0.875 0.878 0.880 0.890 
J-Statistic / Sargan P-value 4.31 
[0.97] 
15.35 
[0.34] 
14.55 
[0.41] 
15.40 
[0.42] 
12.97 
[0.67] 
10.39 
[0.92] 
10.48 
[0.92] 
9.58 
[0.94] 
     Notes: Dependent variable: Sovereign Debt Rating. 
          Estimation Method: TSLS with Regional Dummies and Period Fixed Effects. 
           ***, **  and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels respectively 
           Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the standard errors, and numbers in square parentheses [.] are  the  
Sargan P-values. 
 
Adding the average over the period inflation volatility to the regression (Column 3), the 
coefficient of the lagged rating remains significant.  Interestingly, once the inflation volatility is 
included in the regression, the coefficient of the average over the period inflation turns 
insignificant and its magnitude decreases by almost 50%.  The coefficient of inflation volatility 
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on the other hand, is significant and with the expected negative sign and magnitude. A one 
percent increase in the average over the period of inflation volatility corresponds to about a one 
classification decrease in the sovereign debt rating.12  
 
When private domestic credit as a ratio of GDP is added to the regression (Column 4), 
the coefficients of the lagged rating and average over the period inflation does not change in 
terms of the signs and statistical significance. The average over the period inflation volatility 
turns insignificant with the expected sign. The coefficient of the domestic credit indicates a 
positive and statistically significant impact on sovereign debt rating, albeit of a negligible 
magnitude.  This indicates that the effect of domestic credit on sovereign debt rating is small and 
not economically significant, although it is statistically significant.  
 
Adding the log of per capita GDP to the regression (Column 5), the coefficient of 
inflation volatility turns significant.  In addition, all the previous results in terms of significance 
and magnitudes do not change much except for the coefficient of private domestic credit as a 
ratio to GDP which turns insignificant.  This might be due to the high and positive correlation 
between the per capita GDP and the private domestic credit as a ratio to GDP which is equal to 
0.53.  Hence, the results of Column 5 indicate that there is at best, a weak, indirect relationship 
between domestic credit and sovereign debt rating that is completely dwarfed by the per capita 
GDP. As Column 5 indicates, the coefficient of the per capita GDP proves to be highly 
significant and large in magnitude.  A unit increase in per capita GDP corresponds to about three 
classifications increase in the sovereign debt rating. 
   
In order to estimate the direct effect of financial institutions on sovereign debt rating, the 
Legal2 Index is added to the regression.  As obvious from Column 6, the impact of financial 
institutions on sovereign debt rating appears with the expected positive sign, magnitude, and 
statistical significance.  A one unit increase in the Legal2 Index corresponds to about one unit 
increase in sovereign debt rating. In other words, a country with well developed financial 
institutions has high sovereign debt rating.  Concerning the other coefficients in Column 6, the 
coefficient of the private domestic credit as a ratio to GDP stays insignificant. This might be 
explained by the relatively high positive correlation of 0.64 between the private domestic credit 
as a ratio to GDP and the Legal2 Index.  It is important to note that the correlation between per 
capita GDP and sovereign debt rating is stronger than the correlation between the private 
domestic credit as a ratio to GDP and sovereign debt rating. So it might be the case that the 
impact of per capita GDP overshadows the private domestic credit as a ratio to GDP in the 
regression.  
 
In order to estimate the indirect effect of financial institutions, the interaction term of 
Legal2 Index with inflation volatility is added to the rating regression (Column 7) while keeping 
the Legal2 Index in the set of instruments. The results show a statistically significant negative 
coefficient for the average over the period inflation volatility.  A one percent increase in inflation 
volatility leads to a drop in sovereign debt rating by about two rating classifications.  The Legal2 
Index indirectly reduces this negative impact on sovereign debt rating through its positive 
                                                
12 To account for a possible non-monotonic impact of the level of inflation on the sovereign debt rating, the square 
of the level of inflation was added to the regressions above. The results suggest that the coefficient of the level of 
inflation remains statistically insignificant. Results are available from the author upon request. 
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interaction term with inflation volatility.  In other words, the results of Column 7 seem to show 
that strong financial institutions do significantly enhance the relationship between inflation 
volatility and sovereign debt rating in such a way that countries with high inflation volatility but 
well developed financial institutions, will have higher sovereign debt rating over the next three 
years. 13 
When adding both the financial institutions’ index and its interaction term with inflation 
volatility, or the direct and indirect effects of the financial institutions (Column 8), the results 
show that neither is statistically significant. One possible explanation here is the possibility of 
the presence of imperfect multicollinearity between the two terms where the correlation between 
the financial institutions’ index and its interaction term is around 0.74 as shown in Table 10 of 
the Appendix.  Furthermore, as shown in Table 12 of the Appendix, the F-statistic of the test that 
02 =LEGALβ  and 0int =eractionβ  is equal to about 3.77 which exceeds the critical value of the ∞,2F  
distribution, implying that the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, at least one of the coefficients is 
significant. This suggests that the insignificance of the two coefficients 2LEGALβ  and eractionintβ  in 
Table 4 above is due to the imperfect multicollinearity between the Legal2 Index and its 
interaction with inflation volatility. 
  
In conclusion, this section provides empirical evidence that the magnitude of the negative 
impact of inflation volatility on sovereign debt rating is more important in terms of size and 
statistical significance as compared to the level of inflation. In addition, the negative impact of 
inflation volatility on sovereign debt rating is reduced with the presence of well developed 
financial institutions. Finally, financial institutions have a positive direct and indirect impact on 
sovereign debt rating, where the latter impact works through the institutions’ interaction term 
with inflation volatility.  
 
 
Calculating the Total Effects 
 
The previous discussion has shown that policies aiming at reducing inflation volatility 
would have positive significant impacts on sovereign debt rating.  In addition, policies aiming at 
improving financial institutions have a positive significant impact on sovereign debt rating − 
either a direct or an indirect impact.  In this section, the total effect of a one standard deviation 
decrease in inflation volatility versus the total effect of a one standard deviation increase in the 
Legal2 Index on the sovereign debt rating are compared.14  
 
 
Total Effect of Inflation of Volatility 
 
                                                
13  A robustness check is undertaken using Panel Least Squares with Dummies Variables (LSDV) and period fixed  
     effects for the regressions in Table 4. The results of LSDV confirm the results of TSLS. All results are available   
     from the author upon request. 
14 A robustness check is undertaken on the total effects of both inflation volatility and financial institutions using 
LSDV. The results are robust to the use of a different estimation methodology and this confirms that the instruments 
used are good enough to well estimate the relations of interest. The results are available from the author upon 
request. 
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As the Column 7 of Table 4 shows, improving financial institutions lessens the harmful 
effects of inflation volatility on sovereign debt rating.   However, the question remains: What is 
the total effect of decreasing inflation volatility on the sovereign debt rating?  To answer this 
question, the total effect of a one standard deviation decrease in inflation volatility under 
different levels of LEGAL2 is calculated. 
As Table 5 shows, the total effect is calculated by multiplying the coefficient of inflation 
volatility, 
^
3β  of Equation 2, with the standard deviation of inflation volatility )std(infvol ti,  to 
get )]std(infvol*ˆ[ ti,3β . Similarly, the coefficient of the interaction term of LEGAL2 with 
inflation volatility, 
^
4β of Equation 2, is multiplied by )std(infvol ti,  to get )]std(infvol*ˆ[ ti,4β . 
Next, this latter product is multiplied by the Legal2 Index which is divided into five quintiles.  
Each quintile is multiplied by [
^
4β * std(infvol)] to get [ iLEGAL2 *[
^
4β * std(infvol)]].  
 
The first column of Table 5 shows the quintiles of the index. The first number of this 
column (-2.90) refers to the minimum value of the index; then the next value -1.95 refers to the 0 
– 20th percentile of the index; -1.01 refers to the 20th – 40th percentile; -0.06 refers to the 40th – 
60th percentile; 0.88 refers to the 60th– 80th percentile; and finally 1.83 refers to the 80th – 100th 
percentile of the index. 
 
Table 5.  Total Effect of a One Standard Deviation Change in Inflation Volatility  
(Given the Legal2 Index) 
 
(4) 
L2 
Index 
(5) 
equals (3) 
times (4) 
Total 
Effect 
(2)+(5) 
Variance Confidence Interval t-stat 
-2.90 -2.37 -3.61*** 0.93 [-5.50 , -1.72] -3.75 
-1.95 -1.60 -2.84*** 0.54 [-4.28 , -1.40] -3.87 
-1.01 -0.82 -2.07*** 0.30 [-3.15 , -0.99] -3.75 
-0.06 -0.05 -1.29*** 0.23 [-2.22 , -0.36] -2.72 
0.88 0.72 -0.52 0.30 [-1.60 , 0.56] -0.94 
1.83 1.49 0.25 0.54 [-1.18 , 1.69] 0.35 
(1) Standard Deviation Of Volatility 0.79    
(2) Volatility Coefficient times (1) -1.24    
(3) Interaction Coefficient times (1) 0.82    
  N.B.    ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels, respectively. 
 
As obvious from the “Total Effect” Column of Table 5, with the minimum value of the 
Legal2 Index, a one standard deviation decrease in inflation volatility leads to about four rating 
classifications increase.  As shown in Table 6, this is the case for a country like Peru which has 
the worst level of financial institutional development in the sample.     
           
With a relative improvement in financial institutions, or at the 20th percentile for 
example, a one standard deviation decrease in inflation volatility results in about 3 rating 
classifications increase.  As may be observed in Table 6, this is the case for Argentina, Egypt and 
Uruguay.  
Journal of Development and Economic Policies, 4(1) 29 – 53 
 
 
Countries under the 40th percentile − like Brazil, Colombia, Greece, Mexico, Portugal, 
and Turkey − are all having a lower total effect of inflation volatility.  For this group of 
countries, a one standard deviation decrease in the inflation volatility leads to about 2 
classifications increase in the sovereign debt rating.  
 
                                             Table 6.   Percentiles of the Data on the Legal2 Index    
 
Min  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Max  20th 40th 60th 80th 
-2.9  -1.95  -1.01  -0.06  0.88  1.83  
Per -2.9 Arg -1.98 Bra -1.24 Chi -0.80 Ausl 0.44 Aus 1.07 
  Egy -2.68 Col -1.92 Ind -0.41 Bel 0.54 Can 1.04 
  Uru -2.25 Gre -1.12 Kor -0.20 Den 0.87 Fin 1.23 
    Mex -1.32 S.A -0.11 Fra 0.3 H.K 1.16 
    Por -1.61 Tha -0.48 Ger 0.73 Mal 1.09 
    Tur -1.64   Isr 0.36 N.Z 1.34 
        Ita 0.11 Nor 1.40 
        Jap 0.84 Sin 1.76 
        Neth 0.8 Swe 1.76 
        Spa 0.1 U.K 1.83 
        Swi 0.85 U.S.A 1 
Avg -2.9 Avg -2.30 Avg -1.48 Avg -0.40 Avg 0.54 Avg 1.33 
                                             N.B.  Check Table 1 for reference on the above abbreviations. 
 
For the more institutionally developed countries above the 60thpercentile, the total effect 
of inflation volatility on sovereign debt rating is statistically insignificant. As Table 5 shows, at 
the 60th percentile, the total effect would be about 1 rating classification increase for each one 
standard deviation decrease in inflation volatility.  Countries in this category include: Australia, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland. 
Finally, at both the 80th percentile and at the top quintile of the Legal2 Index, the total effect is 
insignificant and ranges around zero.  This case include countries like Austria, Canada, Finland, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
 
It is interesting to note that countries with relatively underdeveloped institutions have 
higher response to changes in inflation volatility as compared to countries with relatively 
developed institutions.  For instance, a one standard deviation reduction in inflation volatility at 
the 40th percentile of LEGAL2 (e.g. Mexico) leads to about two rating classifications increase. 
Furthermore, a one standard deviation reduction in inflation volatility under the 80th percentile of 
LEGAL2 (e.g. Japan) leads to about one rating classification increase. This suggests that 
countries with relatively well developed financial institutions; inflation volatility has smaller 
negative effect on ratings.  
 
The results discussed here, are intuitive in the sense that well financially developed 
economies have more ways of controlling inflation volatility and dealing with its effects than less 
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institutionally developed economies, and therefore investors do not care as much about the 
consequences of inflation volatility. 
 
 
Total Effect of Financial Institutions 
 
Using the results of Table 4 Column 8, the total effect of in LEGAL2 is calculated as
)ˆ*ˆ( 5,4 ββ +tiInfvol . In order to calculate the total effect of a one standard deviation increase in 
Legal2 Index, the interaction coefficient 4βˆ  and 5βˆ  are multiplied by the standard deviation of 
the Legal2 Index. Thus the total effect of a one standard deviation is calculated as
)*ˆ*)2(( ,4 tii InfvolLstd β )2(*ˆ5 iLstdβ+ , where )2( iLstd  refers to the standard deviation of the 
Legal2 Index. The tiInfvol ,  is substituted for its values at the 20
th, 40th, 60th, 80th, and 90th 
percentiles each one in a turn.  
 
The first column of Table 7 shows the quintiles of the log inflation volatility data.  The 
first number of this column (0.02%) refers to the minimum value of the log of inflation volatility; 
the next value -0.08 refers to the 0 – 20th percentile of the index; 0.22 refers to the 20th – 40th 
percentile; 0.37 refers to the 40th – 60th percentile; 0.70 refers to the 60th– 80th percentile; and 
finally, 2.94 refers to the 80th – 100th percentile of the index.   It may be recalled that the 90th 
percentile (1.3%) is the cutoff point above which the extremely high log inflation volatility data 
are discarded from the sample. 
                        
Table 7.  Total Effect of a One Standard Deviation Change in LEGAL2 (Given Inflation Volatility) 
(4) 
Volatility 
Percentiles 
(5) 
equal (3) 
times (4) 
Total 
Effect 
(2)+(5) 
Variance Confidence Interval t-stat 
0.02 0.02 0.46 0.31 [-0.63 , 1.54] 0.83 
0.08 0.06 0.50 0.28 [-0.53 , 1.53] 0.96 
0.22 0.17 0.61 0.22 [-0.30 , 1.53] 1.32 
0.37 0.29 0.73* 0.17 [-0.08 , 1.54] 1.76 
0.70 0.54 0.99*** 0.14 [0.24 , 1.73] 2.60 
1.30 1.01 1.45** 0.33 [0.32 , 2.59] 2.51 
2.94 2.28 2.73* 2.46 [-0.35 , 5.80]      1.74 
(1) Standard Deviation Of LEGAL2 1.29    
(2) LEGAL2 Coefficient times (1) 0.44    
(3) Interaction Coefficient times (1) 0.78    
 N.B.  ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%   levels, respectively   
 
Additionally, for all the countries on the 40th percentile of inflation volatility and below, 
the total effect of a one unit improvement in the standard deviation of the Legal2 Index has a 
statistically insignificant impact on sovereign debt rating and the magnitude of the total effect 
reaches 0.61 rating classifications at the most.  
                
Table 8.  Percentiles of the Average of the Log of Inflation Volatility Data (1989-2006) 
 Min   20th   40th   60th   80th   90th   Max   
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0.02   0.08   0.22   0.37   0.70   1.30   2.94   
Neth 0.02 Aus 0.07 Fra 0.19 Austl 0.29 Chi 0.40 Isr 1.28 Arg 2.39 
Fin 0.02 Bel 0.05 Nor 0.15 Col 0.30 Egy 0.64 Mex 1.12 Bra 2.77 
    Can 0.04 Spa 0.14 HK 0.26 Ger 0.50 Tur 1.23 Per 2.94 
    Ita 0.07 UK 0.16 Jap 0.28 Gre 0.50 Uru 1.28     
    Swe 0.08 Den 0.19 Mal 0.28 Ind 0.59         
    Swi 0.08     NZ 0.34 Kor 0.42         
    US 0.04     SA 0.31 Por 0.58         
         Tha 0.35 Sin 0.50         
Avg 0.02 Avg 0.06 Avg 0.17 Avg 0.30 Avg 0.52 Avg 1.23 Avg 2.70 
 
 
Furthermore, all countries falling under the 60th percentile and above have a significant 
positive total effect. For instance, under the 90th percentile, a one standard deviation increase in 
Legal2 Index, leads to about one classification increase in sovereign debt rating. As shown in 
Table 8, this is the case with countries like Israel, Mexico, Turkey and Uruguay. 
 
At this point, it is important to know how a developing country, for example Mexico, can 
achieve this one standard deviation increase in its Legal2 Index. An illustrative way to think 
about it is as follows.  A one standard deviation increase in the Legal2 Index moves Mexico’s 
index to a value very close to the Legal2 Index for countries like Switzerland, France, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Netherland, South Africa, New Zealand and United States.  By computing the 
averages of the individual components of the Legal2 Index, creditors’ rights, shareholders’ 
rights, enforcement and accounts for these eight countries, the averages are 2, 2.95, 68.25, and 
9.10.  Comparing these values to their equivalent ones in Mexico, these values are 0, 1.33, 60, 
and 6.2.  The differences between the average values of these four indices for the eight countries 
and the four indices for Mexico, imply that Mexico needs a major improvement in all the four 
components of the Legal2 Index.  The protection of creditors’ rights, for example, is considered 
one of the greatest problems facing businessmen in Mexico. Creditors are afraid to provide 
finances for current or new projects as long as they do not have a direct control over the goods 
provided by debtor as collateral in case of the debtor’s default.  The improvement in the financial 
institutions in Mexico is crucial for it to enjoy the benefits of the one standard deviation increase 
in the Legal2 Index. 
 
 
Impact of the Increase in Sovereign Rating on Long-Term Bond Yield 
 
The previous discussion signifies that a country can increase its sovereign debt rating by 
either following a monetary policy that decreases inflation volatility or by improving its financial 
institutions. The aim of this section is to link the changes in the sovereign debt rating to the 
changes in the average annual long-term bond yield.  A country with low rating is expected to 
pay more premiums on its foreign borrowings and therefore, its long-term bond yield is expected 
to be relatively high when compared with a higher rated country. 
 
It has been observed that under the 40th percentile of the Legal2 Index, where a country 
like Mexico belongs, a one standard deviation decrease in inflation volatility leads to about 2 
rating classifications increase, given the institutions index.  From Table 13 of the Appendix, 
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these 2 rating classifications increase means an increase from the lowest level in the investment 
grade category of “Baa3” or 12 points, to which Mexico belonged in the first quarter of the year 
2000, up to “Baa1” or 14 points. 
 
A possible way of linking this increase in the sovereign debt rating to the annual long 
term bond yield is by plotting a bar chart linking the data of these two variables together.  As 
shown in Figure 1 (at the Appendix), a negative non-linear relationship is observed between the 
sovereign debt rating and the average annual 5-year bond yield.  A country with high rating is 
associated with low average long-term bond yield, and vice versa.  
 
Back to Mexico’s example again, Figure 1 and Table 14 show that the two classifications 
increase in rating from Baa3 to Baa1 are equivalent to a drop in the average annual 5-year bond 
yield from 12.21% to 7.81%.  Hence, a one standard deviation decrease in inflation volatility 
leads to a drop in cost of borrowings by about 4.4%.  
 
Similarly, the link between one standard deviation increase in Legal2 Index and the drop 
in the average annual 5-year bond yield is found. Again for Mexico’s case, a one standard 
deviation increase in the Legal2 Index leads to about one classification increase in rating from 
“Baa3” or 12 points, to which Mexico belonged in the first quarter of the year 2000, up to 
“Baa2” or 11 points.  From Figure 1 and Table 14, the one classification increase in rating, from 
Baa3 to Baa2, is equivalent to a drop in the average annual 5-year bond yield from 12.21% to 
7.94%. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in the Legal2 Index leads to a drop of about 
4.27% in the country’s cost of borrowings. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While many studies have concentrated on the role of macroeconomic fundamentals in 
affecting sovereign debt rating, few of these studies have addressed the role of the second 
moments of macroeconomic aggregates.  Additionally, while there is a growing literature on the 
importance of institutions for a country’s economic growth, there have been very few studies on 
the importance of improving institutions in relation to the sovereign debt rating. 
 
This study contributes to the sovereign debt rating literature by first showing that the 
level of inflation loses its significant impact on sovereign debt rating once inflation volatility is 
included in the regression. Secondly, reducing inflation volatility has a statistically significant 
positive direct impact on sovereign debt rating where a one standard deviation decrease in 
inflation volatility leads to about two rating classifications increase.  Thirdly, improving 
institutions has a statistically significant positive direct and indirect impact on sovereign debt 
rating where a one standard deviation increase in the index of financial institutions leads to about 
one rating classification increase.  Finally, the increase in sovereign debt rating − either due to 
one standard deviation decrease in inflation volatility or to a one standard deviation increase in 
institutions’ index − leads to drops in the average annual long-term bond yield by about 4.4% 
and 4.27% respectively. 
 
Possible future research can depart from this last point where the welfare implications of 
the exogenous drops in the cost of borrowing versus the welfare impacts of the exogenous 
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improvement in institutions for a small open economy are computed.  A good candidate for this 
model is a country like Mexico which fell on the border line between an investment grade and a 
speculative grade in the first quarter of the year 2000.  It will be interesting to see how the 
welfare impacts of the shocks coming from the drop in the cost of borrowing, due to the 
reduction in inflation volatility, compare with welfare impacts of the shocks coming from the 
improvement in institutions, where the latter has two positive welfare effects − one that passes 
through the drop in the cost of borrowing and another, direct exogenous effect through reducing 
the resource waste in the economy. 
 
The study concludes by drawing attention to some important confines of this study that 
are mainly related to measurement errors. The assigning of a linear numerical value to each 
rating letter might not be the optimal strategy.  A nonlinear relationship between assigned 
numbers and rating letters should be considered in future research on the subject matter.  
Furthermore, given the data limitation, measurement errors could arise from the assumption that 
each country has a time invariant index for financial institutions.  Particularly, this could be a 
strong assumption given the improvement in the financial institutions for some countries 
included in the sample. 
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Appendix 
 
 
        Figure 1: The negative relationship between Moody’s rating in 2000 (first quarter) 
                                  And 5-year Annual Bond Yield in 2000 (first quarter)   
 
  Source: Global Financial database for the annual 5-year Bond Yield. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Data Plot for the Dependent and Independent Variables  
For All the Countries in the Sample 
 
Figure 2 A 
 
Source: Moody’s Sovereign Debt Rating Data 
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Source: Data from World Development Indicators, World Bank Database, 2011 
 
 
 
Figure 2 B 
 
Source: Author constructed using Consumer Price Index (CPI) data from  
World Development Indicators, World Bank Database, 2011 
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Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank Database, 2011 
 
 
Figure 2 C 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank Database, 2011 
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Source: LEGAL2 Index (Financial Institution Index), Chinn and Ito (2005). 
 
 
 
Table 9.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Rating Inf Inf Vol DC GDP/cap L2 intL2 
 Mean 16.88 48.43 0.51 86.04 4.00 -0.01 -0.68 
 Median 20.33 3.45 0.28 80.84 4.19 0.36 -0.05 
 Maximum 23.00 3398.68 3.27 228.07 4.60 1.83 0.93 
 Minimum 0.00 -1.58 -0.99 9.17 2.49 -2.90 -9.49 
 Std. Dev. 6.75 328.58 0.79 48.99 0.48 1.32 1.78 
 Skewness -0.94 8.92 1.78 0.48 -0.93 -0.58 -2.89 
 Kurtosis 2.90 84.89 5.97 2.57 3.12 2.17 12.00 
 Jarque-Bera 32.13 64102.52 195.56 10.18 31.77 18.50 1044.83 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Sum 3696.00 10605.80 111.61 18842.17 875.35 -1.82 -149.21 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 9945.84 23536444.00 135.43 523284.60 49.67 379.61 693.75 
 Observations 219.00 219.00 219.00 219.00 219.00 219.00 219.00 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
 2
 - 
1
 3
 - 
3
 4
 - 
5
 7
 - 
1
 8
 - 
3
 9
 - 
5
 1
1 
- 1
 1
2 
- 3
 1
4 
- 1
 1
5 
- 3
 1
6 
- 5
 1
8 
- 1
 1
9 
- 3
 2
0 
- 5
 2
2 
- 3
 2
3 
- 5
 2
5 
- 1
 2
7 
- 3
 2
8 
- 5
 3
0 
- 1
 3
1 
- 3
 3
2 
- 5
 3
4 
- 1
 3
5 
- 3
 3
6 
- 5
Financial Institutions (Index)
27 
 
 
Legend:   Inf refers to inflation;    Inf vol refers to inflation volatility;  DC refers to Domestic credit as a ratio to 
GDP;  GDP/cap is the per capita GDP; L2 is the Legal2 Index; intL2 is the interaction term of the Legal2 Index with 
inflation volatility. 
 
Table 10.  Correlation Matrix 
 
  Rating Inf. Inf. Vol. DC GDP/cap. L2 intL2 
Rating 1.00 -0.30 -0.72 0.59 0.76 0.77 0.62 
Inf. -0.30 1.00 0.41 -0.15 -0.15 -0.22 -0.42 
Inf. Vol. -0.72 0.41 1.00 -0.51 -0.48 -0.65 -0.84 
DC 0.59 -0.15 -0.51 1.00 0.53 0.64 0.50 
GDP/cap. 0.76 -0.15 -0.48 0.53 1.00 0.70 0.43 
L2 0.77 -0.22 -0.65 0.64 0.70 1.00 0.74 
intL2 0.62 -0.42 -0.84 0.50 0.43 0.74 1.00 
                              
N.B.  Please see Legend of Table 9. 
 
Table 11. Regional Dummies 
 
Code Countries Dasian Doecd Dlatin Dafmid 
1 Argentina 0 0 1 0 
2 Australia 0 1 0 0 
3 Austria 0 1 0 0 
4 Belgium 0 1 0 0 
5 Brazil 0 0 1 0 
6 Canada 0 1 0 0 
7 Chile 0 0 1 0 
8 Colombia 0 0 1 0 
9 Denmark 0 1 0 0 
10 Egypt 0 0 0 1 
11 Finland 0 1 0 0 
12 France 0 1 0 0 
13 Germany 0 1 0 0 
14 Greece 0 1 0 0 
15 
Hong 
Kong,Chi 1 0 0 0 
16 India 1 0 0 0 
17 Israel 0 0 0 1 
18 Italy 0 1 0 0 
19 Japan 0 1 0 0 
20 Korea, Rep. 0 1 0 0 
21 Malaysia 1 0 0 0 
22 Mexico 0 1 0 0 
23 Netherlands 0 1 0 0 
24 New Zealand 0 1 0 0 
28 
 
25 Norway 0 1 0 0 
26 Peru 0 0 1 0 
27 Portugal 0 1 0 0 
28 Singapore 1 0 0 0 
29 South Africa 0 0 0 1 
30 Spain 0 1 0 0 
31 Sweden 0 1 0 0 
32 Switzerland 0 1 0 0 
33 Thailand 1 0 0 0 
34 Turkey 0 1 0 0 
35 
United 
Kingdom 0 1 0 0 
36 United States 0 1 0 0 
37 Uruguay 0 0 1 0 
 Legend: Dasian refers to the dummy for Asian countries 
 Doecd refers to the dummy for the OECD countries (includes Japan , Mexico, and Turkey) 
 Dlatin refers to the dummy for the Latin American countries. 
 Dafmid refers to the  dummy for the North African and Middle Eastern countries (includes South Africa) 
 
Table 12.  Wald Coefficients Test 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: BASE   
    
    Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
    
    F-statistic 3.766590 (2, 150)   0.0253 
Chi-square 7.533179 2   0.0231 
    
        
Null Hypothesis Summary:  
    
    Normalized Restriction (= 0) Value   Std. Err. 
    
    C(7) 0.341208 0.438961 
C(8) 0.604794 0.514689 
        N.B.  Restrictions are linear in coefficients. 
 
Table 13.  Definition of Moody’s Sovereign Debt Rating 
 
  
Moody's 
Rating Classification 
Investment Grade 23 Aaa 
  22 Aa1 
  21 Aa2 
  20 Aa3 
29 
 
  19 Aa 
  18 A1 
  17 A2 
  16 A3 
  15 A 
  14 Baa1 
  13 Baa2 
  12 Baa3 
Speculative Grade 11 Ba1  
  10 Ba2 
  9 Ba3 
  8 B1 
  7 B2 
  6 B3 
  5 Caa1 
  4 Caa2  
  3 Caa3  
  2 Ca 
  1 C 
 
 
Table 14. Annual Yield in 2000 (first quarter) and Moody’s rating in 2000 
Country Yield Rating 
Average 
Yield 
Australia 6.40 23   
Austria 5.46 23   
Denmark 5.39 23   
Finland 4.91 23   
France 4.96 23   
Germany 4.86 23   
Ireland 5.06 23   
Netherlands 5.03 23   
Norway 6.18 23   
Switzerland 4.18 23   
UK 5.86 23   
US 5.88 23 5.30 
Belgium 5.09 22   
Canada 6.07 22   
Japan 1.07 22   
Singapore 3.72 22   
Sweden 5.32 22 4.37 
New Zealand 7.02 21   
Portugal 5.25 21   
Spain 5.09 21 5.86 
Iceland 10.50 20   
Italy 5.04 20 7.80 
30 
 
Czech 
Republic 6.11 18 6.11 
Botswana 8.00 17   
Cyprus 7.35 17   
Greece 6.03 17   
Israel 5.60 17 6.87 
Hong Kong 6.90 16   
Hungary 8.33 16  
Malta 5.33 16 6.85 
Chile 5.90 14   
Estonia 10.82 14   
Poland 6.70 14 7.81 
Korea 9.54 13   
Latvia 9.13 13   
Malaysia 5.15 13 7.94 
                                           
Mexico 17.40 12   
South Africa 13.57 12   
Thailand 5.67 12 12.21 
Lithuania 11.62 11   
Morocco 5.80 11   
Philippines 13.50 11   
Slovak 
Republic 8.64 11 9.89 
Colombia 18.00 10   
Fiji 5.26 10   
India 11.32 10 11.53 
Jamaica 24.75 9   
Jordan 7.00 9   
Peru 11.21 9 14.32 
Argentina 9.73 8   
Brazil 11.31 8   
Kazakhstan 9.98 8   
Lebanon 8.99 8   
Turkey 4.87 8 8.97 
Bulgaria 9.31 7   
Honduras 14.16 7   
Venezuela 21.42 7 14.96 
Indonesia 11.48 6   
Ecuador 13.66 5   
Pakistan 13.98 5 13.82 
                                               Source: Global Financial Database for the annual yield data 
 
 
